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The financial crisis that began in the United States in the sub-prime mortgage market in 2007 and that 
spread quickly to Europe has become a global crisis, affecting both financial systems across the globe 
and  economic  activity  in  virtually  all  countries.  Emerging  market  countries  have  been  hit  hard.  Even 
those countries that had strengthened their policies and built defenses to withstand a less benign global 
environment than that which existed for much of the previous decade have not been spared.
The serious nature of this still-unfolding crisis is evident in the increasingly pessimistic picture painted 
by forecasts for economic growth. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2007, forecasts for growth rates in 
2008 and beyond have been repeatedly revised downward. As of this writing, this monotonic pattern of 
downward revisions has yet to be reversed. The latest projections from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: GDP Growth Projections 
(in percent)
2008 2009 2010              2011
World 3.2 -1.3 1.9 4.3
Advanced Economies 0.8 -3.8 0.01 2.6
     US 1.1 -2.8 -0.05 3.5
     EU 1.1 -4.0 -0.3 1.7
     Japan -0.6 -6.2 0.5 2.2
Emerging Market Economies 5.2 0.01 3.2 5.7
     Emerging Asia  6.3 2.5 5.0 7.6
     Emerging South Asia 7.0 4.3 5.3 6.6
     Emerging Europe 4.0 -4.8 0.7 3.6
     Emerging Americas 4.0 -1.7 1.6 3.5
     Emerging Middle East 5.3 0.5 2.4 3.9
     Emerging Africa 4.8 1.5 3.7 5.2
     Newly Industrialized Asia 1.6 -5.6 0.8 4.4
     Developing Asia 7.7 4.8 6.1 8.3
China 9.0 6.5 7.5 10.2
India 7.3 4.5 5.6 6.9
                       Source:  IMF, World Economic Outlook, April, 2009
The global economy is now expected to contract this year by 1.3 percent – the first such contraction since 
the Second World War. However, this figure hides significant differences among countries and regions. 
The worst affected regions include emerging Europe, the CIS countries and the newly industrialized Asian 
economies, each of which is expected to see contractions in GDP in 2009 near or even above five percent. 
Some other regions are expected to do much better, including the emerging market countries of South 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East, most of which are expected to avoid recession. But there is a wide range of 
projections even within regions. Most notably, while emerging Asia as a whole is projected to grow by 2.5 
percent this year, the developing countries within the region are set to grow at near five percent, while the 
newly industrialized countries are projected to contract by 5.6 percent. The worst hit counties are expected 
to include Singapore (-10 percent), Taiwan-China (-7.5 percent), Hong Kong-China (-4.5 percent) and Korea 
(-4 percent). China and India, the largest emerging economies in the region and in the world, are projected 
to grow by 6.5 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively. While surprisingly good in the current environment, 
these growth rates are, of course, below those registered by these countries in recent years. Some of the 
reasons for this diverse performance will be touched upon in subsequent sections of this paper. 
The global contraction is forecast to give way to renewed growth next year, with world GDP increasing 
by almost two percent. Again, however, the performance in the advanced economies is expected to be 
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expected to vary substantially. The major industrial economies are expected to see little or no growth year-
on-year in 2010, and, at best, to return to potential only at the end of the year. The emerging economies, 
however, are projected to grow by over three percent, with Asia leading the way at about five percent. 
Once again, the developing countries in Asia are expected to register the best performance. As always, 
there are significant caveats about these projections. However, there are recent signs that the bottom may 
have been reached in a number of countries, including in Asia, so that the next revision of these projections 
may see at least a halt to the repeated worsening of the picture seen over the last two years. For example, 
the most recent data from China indicate that investment spending, bolstered by the stimulus package 
introduced late last year, has risen to record highs, bank lending is already ahead of the government’s 
target for all of 2009, industrial production is expanding significantly, and retail sales have recovered. 
That said, there are well known lags in the recovery process – including in the recovery of employment. 
This is particularly the case in the advanced economies where employers commit to new hiring only after 
clear signs of a rebound in activity. Thus, in most of the industrial world, unemployment is expected to 
continue to increase throughout most of 2010, causing continued pain. Moreover, there will be a critical 
question about the sustainability of any recovery. A return to the global imbalances of the past decade will 
threaten that sustainability.. Renewed global growth will be secure only if the macroeconomic structures 
of a number of economies – especially the savings balances in the United States and China – emerge as 




The transmission of the crisis from the U.S. and Europe to the rest of the world came through a number 
of channels. The financial institutions in most emerging market economies had not engaged in the kind 
of practices seen in the institutions that populate the financial centers in the major industrial countries. 
Balance sheets were typically not exposed to the toxic assets that increasingly dominated positions in the 
major institutions. Derivatives were employed much less frequently and were generally limited to the more 
traditional instruments employed to hedge against currency and other risks associated with trade. Financial 
institutions in the emerging economies either shied away from the more exotic instruments, including such 
things as credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations, or were prevented by regulation from 
holding or trading such instruments. Banking was generally of the more “boring”, old fashioned kind! 
But, in the end, this did not protect these countries. Five major channels brought the crisis home to these 
economies:
First  was  the  withdrawal  of  funds  by  some  of  the  major  financial  institutions  from  their  •	
subsidiaries  located  in  the  emerging  economies. The  general  contraction  of  the  balance 
sheets of the major institutions and the need to rebuild their capital base has constrained 
the funding available to other institutions in both the industrial countries (e.g., hedge funds) 
and in the emerging world that rely on dollar (or even Euro) funding. This has been the case 
notwithstanding the massive support injected into banking systems in the financial centers 
that are home to most of the major international banks.
Second  was  the  seizing-up  of  the  international  credit  markets.  Credit  flows  through  the  •	
international banks and global bond markets to emerging market countries all but dried 
up. This has created significant financial stress in some of those countries – especially those 
in central and Eastern Europe – that ran up dangerously large current account deficits and 
took on substantial international debt. For example, BIS data show that consolidated claims 
of BIS-reporting banks on all emerging market economies decreased from a peak of $5.4 
trillion in June, 2008 to $4.6 trillion by December – a decline of over 14 percent. No emerging 
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3market regions were spared, and all of them saw similar declines. Recent anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this withdrawal has continued in most regions. Data on capital flows show 
an even more dramatic picture. Net private flows to emerging market countries peaked at 
about 5 percent of GDP in 2007. However, all categories of inward flows to emerging market 
countries have registered significant declines from 2007 to 2008 and are projected to decline 
further in 2009. The cumulative decline in the major categories of flows to emerging market 
countries between 2007 and 2009 are currently expected to be very large: 62 percent for 
international bond issues; 61 percent for commercial bank loans; and 54 percent for inward 
direct investment. (Table 2) The flow of export credits to the emerging market countries as 
well as inward portfolio investment all but collapsed in 2008. The withdrawal of portfolio 
investment was a key factor behind a decline in emerging stock markets that exceeded the 
sharp declines in advanced economy markets.3
Table 2: Capital Flows, Export Financing and International Reserves
(US$ billions)
2006 2007 2008 2009              2010
Emerging Market Countries:
Export Credits 37.4 48.7 62.6 -100.8 13.5
International Bond Issues 133.8 189.0 142.4 71.4 100.6
Commercial Bank Loans  403.9 505.1 453.0 195.6 254.7
Inward Portfolio Investment 156.0 231.4 -214.3 -55.2 76.9
Inward FDI 487.6 656.8 674.0 299.1 399.6
Change in International Reserves 724.2 1,248.5 458.5 -393.3 135.4
Emerging Asia:
Export Credits 13.1 16.5 28.0 -42.0 7.5
International Bond Issues 46.1 46.5 39.4 23.5 30.4
Commercial Bank Loans  100.8 102.3 81.5 37.3 52.0
Inward Portfolio Investment 106.9 184.0 -159.8 -68.1 29.3
Inward FDI 215.6 303.1 317.2 127.2 165.1
Change in International Reserves 416.6 711.3 423.1 -37.7 110.8
Emerging South Asia:
Export Credits 3.6 3.2 6.8 -6.1 2.1
International Bond Issues 5.9 6.2 5.8 4.7 5.2
Commercial Bank Loans  10.2 9.8 9.2 7.0 8.2
Inward Portfolio Investment 6.9 36.5 -15.6 5.5 16.1
Inward FDI 25.1 31.2 47.7 32.6 38.3
Change in International Reserves 43.2 102.7 -25.1 -37.6 -15.0
Source:  The Economist Intelligence Unit
In total, emerging market economies – especially those that are heavily indebted and face large financing 
requirements both from current deficits as well as from the need to refinance maturing debt - have seen a 
substantial decline in all major categories of capital inflows. Some of the worst affected countries have also 
recorded significant capital flight and sharp depreciations of their currencies. All of this has been reflected in a 
substantial fall in international reserves, with emerging market countries in all regions of the world other than 
East Asia recording significant declines; emerging countries in Europe were the most seriously affected. 
 
Third, was the impact of the crisis on economic activity - in the first instance, in the United  •	
States  and  Europe,  and  subsequently  in  Japan.  Initially,  this  manifested  itself  in  a  sharp 
3  That pattern has now been reversed with emerging stock markets significantly outperforming advanced county markets since the beginning 
of this year.
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4contraction in exports from those emerging market countries that had become the largest 
exporters to the industrial world. Quite rapidly, however, exports declined from the other 
emerging economies, i.e., those whose exports consisted of raw and intermediate goods 
shipped to those larger emerging market countries, particularly China, that had become key 
providers of final manufactured goods in the increasingly complex supply chains that came 
to populate world trade.   
  This fall in exports – at a virtually unprecedented rate of collapse - created an internal feedback 
loop wherein the initial reduction in trade weakened the domestic economies of the emerging 
market countries, with further negative feedback on the financial sectors in those countries as 
the quality of domestic credit deteriorated. 
Fourth, are the still uncertain prospects for remittances – an important source of income  •	
and foreign exchange in many emerging market economies. Total remittances to emerging 
market countries were over US$ 206 billion in 2007 and are estimated to have reached more 
than $230 billion in 2008 (Table 3). Like unemployment figures, remittances tend to lag the 
decline in economic activity – and will likely lag in the recovery. While recent data are sketchy, 
remittances to emerging market countries appear to be falling significantly and are estimated 
to total only about $170 billion this year before recovering somewhat to about $195 billion 
in 2010.4  Such projections are subject to a wide margin of error and are dependent on an 
assumed recovery in the global economy. Interestingly, the transfer of domestic remittances, 
i.e., those remittances that go from individuals who have moved to urban areas in search of 
employment and higher income to those left behind in the rural or less developed regions 
of a country, have also declined. This is helping to transfer the weakness in the export and 
service sectors in emerging economies to parts of those countries that otherwise would have 
been less affected. The return of workers from abroad could put additional pressure on these 
regions as those workers seek employment in already depressed economies.
Table 3: Workers Remittances
(US$ billions)
2006 2007 2008 2009              2010
Remittance inflows to: 
Emerging Market Countries
172.3 206.2 231.7 170 195
Emerging Asia 86.3 111.8 132.9 95 115
Emerging South Asia 38.7 50.4 63.3 46 57
India  25.7 35.0 45.0 30 40
China  22.5 32.0 37.0 26 34
Philippines 14.9 15.6 16.8 12 11
Vietnam  4.8 7.6 9.3 7.8 7.9
Bangladesh 5.5 6.9 8.5 6.7 7.8
Pakistan 5.4 6,0 7.1 6.8 6.9
Emerging Markets Countries are classified as Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia,  Ghana, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan (China), Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam 
 Source:  The Economist Intelligence Unit
4  In Asia, remittances are expected to fall by almost 30 percent this year to $95 billion from the peak of over $130 billion reached in 2008, but 
to rebound to about $115 billion in 2010. The countries in the region that are the largest recipients of remittances (India, China, the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Bangladesh and Pakistan) will see flows decline from over $123 billion in 2008 to less than $90 billion in 2009. A recovery to about $107 
billion is forecast for 2010. 
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5Fifth,  and  finally,  is  the  psychological  factor. The  world  has  become  all  too  familiar  with  •	
financial cries. But a financial crisis originating in the United States and spreading quickly to 
other industrial countries took most of the world by surprise. So did the severe worsening 
of the crisis in September and October, 2008 which saw the collapse of some of the world’s 
most prized private financial institutions and extraordinary – and untested – policy actions 
by industrial country  governments. This was quickly followed by a seizing-up of financial 
markets around the world, a massive loss in asset values, and a virtually unprecedented 
collapse of exports. It is fair to say that no one was prepared for this, and that it undermined 
the business plans and expectations of almost everyone. The decline in asset values, especially 
of equities and houses, and the rapid rise in unemployment brought that insecurity and its 
accompanying fear to consumers. Financial systems and economies are driven by confidence. 
These events thoroughly shook consumers’ confidence, causing a self-aggravating feedback 
to the rest of the economy. This experience may well affect the nature of any recovery in ways 




Virtually all emerging market countries have been affected by these developments. However, the policy 
responses have been very different and go some way to explain the diversity of growth prospects pointed 
to above.In light of the impact of the crisis on the availability of capital through the international financial 
markets, a number of countries have entered into swap arrangements so as to strengthen their reserve 
positions. The largest such operations have involved the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank entering into temporary 
reciprocal currency arrangements for the provision of dollar liquidity with Brazil, Mexico, Singapore and 
South Korea. Other bilateral swap arrangements have been agreed or increased, and a number of multilateral 
arrangements have been discussed, e.g., through the G7 and through the Chiang Mai Initiative. A significant 
number of emerging market countries have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for support. 
Since mid-2008 – after a steady decline in both the number of countries borrowing from the IMF and in 
the outstanding claims of the institution on member countries – fourteen emerging market countries have 
secured IMF financial support totaling more than US$53 billion. The largest financing arrangements have 
been with Hungary, Pakistan, Ukraine, Belarus and Iceland. Most recently, Mexico has availed itself of the 
IMF’s new Flexible Credit Line (FCL) in an amount of about $47 billion. This arrangement, the first under 
the IMF’s new crisis prevention facility, is intended to be precautionary and the Mexican authorities have 
indicated that they do not intend to draw on those resources. With the absence of a quick recovery in 
international credit markets, the IMF is likely to see increasing demand from emerging market countries 
facing declining exports and the need to roll-over substantial amounts of international debt.
Measures to Strengthen Financial Sectors
Measures taken by some countries have attempted to address the impact on the banking sector and the 
financial sector more generally of both the direct effects of the financial crisis and the emerging effect of 
weakening domestic economies. In at least twenty emerging market countries, existing deposit insurance 
schemes have been modified to broaden the kinds of deposits covered or to increase the maximum 
amount covered. A number of countries in Asia that had not previously had deposit insurance schemes 
have introduced them as a means of bolstering public confidence in their banking systems. 
Other measures directed at the banking and financial systems have included capital injections and other 
support mechanisms for domestic banks, both to assist banks in meeting minimum capital adequacy 
standards and to support bank lending operations, especially in the critical area of trade credit. Many 
of the measures taken have been ad hoc and have confronted the same problem that surfaced in the 
more advanced economies, i.e., the consistency and coordination across borders of measures to support 
domestic banking systems. (See the section below on lessons from the crisis for more on this issue.)
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Along with most of the world’s more advanced economies, a large number of emerging market countries 
have also introduced ambitious fiscal stimulus packages. For example, the emerging market countries 
that are members of the G20 have taken significant measures to bolster domestic activity. Of those 11 
countries, only Turkey has chosen not to introduce a special stimulus package.  The largest such initiative 
by far has been undertaken by China. A package comprised solely of expenditure measures is estimated by 
the staff of the IMF to amount to US$93.3 billion in 2009 and an additional US$102 billion in 2010 - over two 
percent of China’s GDP in each of those years. The packages announced by the other countries in the group 
total over US$80 billion, with India accounting for US$6.8 billion. On average these stimulus packages are 
estimated to add almost 1.5 percent to the GDP of most of these economies. In a number of countries, 
automatic stabilizers that lower the tax burden or increase public spending will add to the impact of these 
discretionary measures. However, the impact of those stabilizers is generally minor and varies significantly 
across the emerging market countries.
There is considerable variation across these countries in the composition of these stimulus packages.   
On average, about one-third of the measures comprise direct government tax cuts and other revenue 
measures to spur private spending and about two-thirds comprise expenditure measures. In virtually all 
countries the expenditure measures are heavily weighted towards infrastructure spending. In China, for 
example, the stimulus package is comprised solely of expenditure measures. In India, on the other hand, 
about one-third of the measures are temporary indirect tax reductions. Some of these emerging market 
countries that are taking these measures are those that have built up sizeable international reserves and 
have run significant fiscal surpluses in recent years. These policies have created both fiscal space and the 
reserves needed to manage large stimulus packages. Other countries, India included, have been more 
constrained in their capacity to employ fiscal stimulus to help counter the impact of the crisis.  Still other 
countries, especially in Eastern Europe, have had no scope to take such actions and, indeed, have had to 
take measures to tighten expenditures.5
For some other countries, stimulus packages – along with the impact of declining levels of activity in 
their economies – will worsen both fiscal positions and debt profiles in the short run. These realities have 
led a number of countries to hesitate in announcing further stimulus measures for 2010. This caution is 
warranted, not least as the global conditions for securing new financing that confront these countries 
– and the private sectors in these countries – may deteriorate further. That will depend on the extent to 
which the contraction of international capital flows to these countries since early 2008 will be reversed.   
That, in turn, will depend on how the unprecedented levels of borrowing by many of the major industrial 
countries affect conditions in the global markets, including interest rates.6
Protectionist Measures
Unfortunately, and in contrast to the generally constructive measures described above, protectionist trade 
measures have also been part of the response to the crisis. Recalling the experience of the 1930’s, the 
leaders of the G20 signed a pledge at their November 15, 2008 summit to avoid protectionist measures. 
That pledge notwithstanding, by February 2009, 17 members of the G20 had implemented 47 restrictive 
trade measures. According to the World Bank’s monitoring list of trade and trade related measures, 66 
5  The recent actions taken by Latvia to reduce its budget deficit, in large part through sharp cuts in spending, constitute one of the most 
dramatic examples of such policies.
6  The OECD estimates that its member governments will issue almost $12 trillion in debt (gross) in 2009, about one-third more than the $9 trillion 
issued two years ago. The U.S. alone is expected to sell almost $8 trillion in government securities. There have already been some troubling signs 
in government debt markets in the industrial countries: a failed issue by Germany earlier in the year; a recent sharp uptick in the 10 year bond 
rate in the United States and a generally poor reception to the government’s 10-year bond auction which saw an unusual yield markup on issue..   
In the market for U.S. debt in particular, there is an additional threat of “roll-over risk” as the average maturity of government debt is only about 
4.7 years – unusually short by industrial country standards. In the emerging market countries, there are troubling signs as well. There was a failed 
auction by Latvia of $100 million in short term treasury bills in early June; and warnings have been issued by some of the rating agencies over 
the creditworthiness of some Asian countries, including the lowering of outlooks for India and Taiwan from stable to negative by Standard and 
Poor’s and a cut in Malaysia’s long term local currency rating from A-plus to A by Fitch.
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relied solely on subsidies and other support packages. Developing countries have employed a variety 
of measures, including subsidies, import duties, import bans and non-tariff measures. In the developed 
countries, and particularly in the high income countries, subsidies to the auto industry have proliferated 
and are estimated to total $48 billion worldwide. But the emerging market countries have also been active 
in the automotive sector, especially in protecting their component suppliers. Protectionist tendencies have 
also been evident in the financial sector: virtually all nations have focused their financial sector subsidies 
on domestically owned banks rather than subsidiaries of foreign banks.
While many of these protectionist measures, thus far, are relatively minor, they are of significant importance 
for particular exporters. They also reflect a trend that contradicts the pledges made by the countries in the 
G20, both developed and emerging economies. This is a matter of concern and warrants close monitoring 
and publicity to help stem this tide. There is no need to learn again the lessons of the 1930’s!
Decoupling
 
The impact of the crisis in the US and Europe on the emerging market economies has surprised some analysts.   
A proposition had been put forward that the emerging economies had “decoupled” from the industrial world 
to a degree that would permit them to more easily absorb the impact of a slowdown in economic activity 
in those countries. The serious global impact of this crisis would seem to put the lie to that proposition. The 
evidence is growing that decoupling has not occurred to anything like the extent that would be needed to 
isolate the emerging economies from a weakening of activity in the industrial world.8 Indeed, it could be 
argued that the explosion of global trade – the major force in the rapid growth of many of the emerging 
economies over the last few decades, together with the design of the world’s supply chains, as well as the 
ever-increasing integration of financial markets has, in fact, increased the coupling of the emerging market 
economies – and many of the poorer developing countries - with the industrial world.
Perhaps  even  more  important,  beyond  trade,  other  inter-linkages  have  developed  that  increase  the 
dependency among various groups of countries and, in some ways, reverse the direction of influence. For 
example, for years it was the developing world and the emerging market countries, in particular, that were 
dependent for their financing on the global financial markets centered in the industrial countries. Large 
current account deficits in the emerging market countries were financed through capital flows from the 
industrial world. Much of that financing took the form of bank loans until the mid 1980’s; and then increasingly 
took the form of flows through the bond markets. That story ended in the financial crises in Latin America 
in the 1980’s and in Asia and elsewhere in the 1990’s and the first few years of this millennium. Important 
lessons were learned in those crises and many of the emerging market countries fundamentally changed 
the  management  of  their  economies.  Macroeconomic  policies  became  more  orthodox;  policy-making 
institutions were strengthened; and the flow of capital shifted dramatically. Together with the rise in crude 
oil and other commodity prices, the rapid growth of emerging market countries with high savings rates, and 
the shift in the United States to negative savings by both the government and consumers, fundamentally 
changed the nature and the flow of capital – and dependency – among the world’s economies. 
7  These measures do not include “automatic” increases in agricultural protection, contingent protection (e.g., anti-dumping), WTO-sanctioned 
measures to retaliate against trading partners that have not complied with findings of a WTO dispute settlement panel, or financial sector 
subsidies. Antidumping cases surged in 2008, with initiations rising by 15 percent and findings with imposition duties growing by 22 percent. 
India is the most active, accounting for 29 percent of total initiations. See Trade Protection: Incipient but Worrisome Trends, Elisa Gamberoni and 
Richard Newfarmer, in Trade Notes, Number 37, The World Bank, March, 2009.
8 Some of the original arguments about decoupling rested on the ever-increasing trade among the emerging market economies themselves. But 
much of this trade reflected the fundamental shift that was occurring in the locus of manufacturing – the supply chain – in the global economy. 
Much of that trade between the emerging market economies – and, indeed, even between the industrial and emerging market economies – 
reflected the specialization of manufacturing in different countries on inputs and components that were then shipped elsewhere for further 
processing and assembly before shipment to the final user. In many ways, this led to an increase in the inter-linkages between economies rather 
than a reduction. Interestingly, this increased interdependence through supply chains may have helped limit the protectionist response of some 
countries to the downturn in the global economy as export interests are relatively much more powerful than before in many countries.
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It was the rapid growth of many of the emerging market countries themselves that led to the sharp 
rise in commodity and raw material prices. That development, in turn, became the dominant influence 
on inflationary pressures in the industrial world, limiting the power of traditional central bank policy 
instruments to control domestic inflation. Thus, the interlinkages between the industrial and emerging 
world have become far more complex and multi-dimensional – and the very concept of decoupling seems 
almost quaint! The framework of analysis can no longer be limited to the impact of the level of activity in 
the industrial world – or the impact of a single market, such as that for equities - on the emerging market 
economies. As important are the influence of high savings rates and capital flows from the emerging 
economies to the industrial world – and especially to the United States.
Thus, rather than a decoupling, an increased inter-dependence has emerged. Policy in the industrial countries 
needs to anticipate the impact of growth in the emerging world (through the effects on commodity prices, 
for example), and the impact of changing savings rates and portfolio investment preferences on interest 
rates and exchange rates. In turn, policy in the emerging market countries needs to anticipate the impact 
of changing levels of activity in the industrial world on exports and on foreign direct investment, and 
changing savings rates, especially in the U.S.
 
Notwithstanding the apparent power of these arguments, the proposition that emerging market countries 
have de-coupled from the industrial world still finds some favor.  In a recent issue of the Economist (May 
22-29, 2009) it is argued that (1) “…the biggest emerging economies are less dependent on American 
spending than commonly believed;” and (2) “…they have proven more able and willing to respond to 
economic weaknesses than many feared.”. The first of these propositions may turn out to be correct. That 
will be tested if the recent increase in savings by the American consumer persists and the spending rate 
does not recover to earlier levels.9 
 
Perhaps more important, it is not clear that the second point made above has much to do with the basic 
concept of decoupling. Decoupling is a proposition about the impact of a slowdown in activity in the 
industrial or developed world on the level of activity and growth in the emerging, and developing world. 
If the emerging economies have shown that they have the capacity to offset that impact to some degree 
through their own countercyclical policies, that is to be welcomed. But one should not confuse that with 
decoupling.  That is, instead, a matter of the extent to which emerging economies can offset the impact of 
changing levels of activity in the countries to which they are coupled. So long as they remain coupled, the 
important questions will be to what extent they have the capacity to take such offsetting action. It is not a 
matter of taking solace in the possibility that there will be no impact.
This interpretation of what may now be happening is important. It leads to questions about what emerging 
market countries need to do to keep themselves ready to respond to a slowdown in the industrial world. It 
does not suggest that they need not be so prepared because they have decoupled! The reason that many 
emerging market economies were prepared to design and implement policies to help counter the impact of 
the current recession in most of the industrial world was the result of the fundamental shift in the practice of 
economic management that took place in those countries in the wake of the financial market crisis that hit so 
many of them from the mid 1990’s until the early 2000’s. Far more responsible fiscal policies were introduced in 
many countries; inflationary risks were taken more seriously and monetary policy was more singularly focused 
on that objective; better regulation – and greater transparency – was introduced into banking systems; 
many governments got out of businesses that are better left in the hands of the private sector; international 
reserves were increased by substantial amounts – in some cases excessively; and so on. These were hard 
won achievements, but they have paid off in faster growth and in a capacity to counter contractionary forces 
9  That outcome would appear quite likely – at least for a number of years, as a structural shift appears to be taking place in the saving habits 
of individuals in response to the significant decline in asset values that has occurred. The assumption that saving out of current income was 
unnecessary as wealth could more painlessly be accumulated through ownership of houses and other real assets has been severely tested and 
found wanting. It is no coincidence that the highest net debt to GDP ratios in the U.S. were registered just before the depression of the 1930’s 
and just before the current crisis. In the earlier episode, the saving rate increased, and debt levels fell, for a long period after the depression. 
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economies and to maintain or restore growth, they should ask which policies allowed them to do that and 
how they can maintain that readiness in the future. Other emerging economies that skated closer to the edge 
with weak fiscal positions, over-borrowing, lax regulations, unsustainable borrowing, weak debt management 
policies, and mistaken capital market liberalization polices should learn from the success of the others.
Lessons from the Crisis
 
Against this background, a number of critical policy questions now confront the emerging market countries. 
Mmuch work will be needed to sort through the lessons of this crisis.  This paper will raise only four of the 
questions that need to be addressed – both individually by these countries, and collectively by both the 
emerging and the more developed countries. These include:
What has been learned about financial sector regulation and supervision in the current crisis? More  1. 
generally, what is the appropriate model for emerging market countries to look to in designing 
their financial regulatory systems?
Did the accumulation of large stocks of international reserves by many of the emerging market  2. 
countries put them in a better position to confront the current crisis? Was it beneficial from a longer 
term cost/benefit perspective, or was it overdone?  Related to the question of the appropriate level 
of reserves, are there lessons to be learned about the dominant role of the U.S. dollar as the primary 
reserve asset in the global system?
What preliminary lessons have been learned about the capacity of the emerging market economies  3. 
to engage in stimulative domestic monetary and fiscal policies in the face of a softening or a 
contraction of global demand? What conditions are necessary for such measures to be both feasible 
and effective and how powerful can the impact of such measures be on the global economy? And
A number of countries, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, have been severely damaged by the  4. 
reversal of capital flows in the past year. In many cases, the fault has been seen to lie, at least in 
part, in the policies pursued in opening their capital markets. What are the lessons that have been 
learned? What should be done to avoid a repeat of this experience in these and, as importantly, in 
frontier emerging economies? Is there a greater role for the IMF here?
These are all difficult questions. In the remainder of this paper, the first three questions will be elaborated 
upon to begin a discussion of the issues they raise. The last question is addressed in separate papers and 
may be an element in the discussions to take place in subsequent days regarding the reform of the IMF and 
of the global economic and financial architecture.
Financial Sector Regulation
One of the major factors leading to the current crisis was what many consider to have been inadequate 
regulation and supervision both within and across those countries that host the global financial centers and 
the major international financial institutions. It was facilitated by the extraordinarily weak performance of 
many of the credit rating agencies – which failed in their most fundamental fiduciary responsibilities. Much 
of this stemmed from the persistent trend towards deregulation in the U.S. – driven more by ideology than 
by evidence; from an almost blind faith in the efficient markets hypotheses; from the competitive pressures 
that undermined prudent financial risk management in some of the major global financial centers; from 
the possibilities that existed to arbitrage regulations across jurisdictions; and from the complexity of some 
of the financial innovations of this period. 
Notwithstanding the increased complexity of the global financial markets, much of the regulatory failure 
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the special investment vehicles (SIVs) that have come to plague the banking system in the U.S., and in the 
trading of credit default swaps and other exotic – and, it might noted, formerly illegal – instruments. It was 
reflected in inadequate capital and liquidity requirements that failed to keep up with the innovations that 
were taking place in the banks and in the financial system more generally. But perhaps most importantly – 
and most inexcusably – many of the problems that developed stem from a simple lack of attention to the 
incentives that were permitted to build in the system. The result was that the system went from “exotic” to 
“toxic” in short order!
Take just the example of the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States.
Mortgage originators held virtually none on the debt they created; they sold it off as fast as  •	
possible after the mortgage was signed and got their fees. As a result, they had little interest 
in the quality of the credit; they had, as is said, “no skin in the game”!
The mortgages were then quickly sold to Wall Street to bundle with other mortgages into  •	
securitized instruments to be sold to investors. Those doing the bundling received their fees 
and, like the originators, had little interest in the quality of the credit. Wall Street profited 
enormously from this business and quickly developed a voracious appetite for mortgages 
to slice and dice into more and more exotic instruments, putting further pressure on the 
originators to deliver more and more mortgages.
The compensation structure in the banks and other institutions was based on the short term  •	
payoff to activities such as this. It was divorced from the longer term risks that the institutions 
were taking on – especially as they began to hold these instruments themselves on their own 
balance sheets or off-balance sheet in the SIVs.
The rating agencies – which should have cared about the quality of the credit, and had a  •	
fundamental responsibility to have such concerns – received their fees from those who had 
bundled the mortgages and were trying to market them. If a particular rating agency did not 
provide the rating wanted by the issuers, it would lose the business to a more willing agency. 
This represented a clear conflict of interest; but nothing was done to halt the process.
The target investors, who were searching for yield in a low interest rate environment that  •	
was allowed to persist for far too long, failed in their own due diligence. If those investors 
saw some risk in the instruments they were purchasing, there were other institutions that 
happily sold the credit default swaps to insure against default. But those latter institutions 
saw virtually no risk of default and failed to provision anywhere near sufficiently against those 
losses. They even sold insurance to investors who did not own the underlying instrument they 
were betting against. This is a big part of the AIG story! 
Where were the regulators and supervisors while all this was going on? They were apparently blinded by 
the deregulation mantra that had developed, by the priority to home-ownership that became policy in the 
United States and in some other countries, and by the view that central banks could not, in any case, do 
anything to prevent bubbles.10 And so they let the party continue! Unfortunately, regulators in some other 
10  There is an interesting contrast between the U.S. and Canada as regards the regulation of the mortgage market. In the U.S., interest payments 
(within generous limits) are deductable from federal income taxes; minimum required down payments all but disappeared during the housing 
boom that began in the mid 1980’s; mortgage originators were not required to hold on their own books any part of the mortgages they created. 
The vast majority of mortgages ended up being bundled into securitized instruments, further distancing the debtor from the ultimate creditor; 
and most mortgages were written with variable interest rates, many with “teaser” initial rates. Many of these policies and practices were intro-
duced or endorsed as a means of encouraging home ownership in the United States. By contrast, in Canada, none of these policies or practices 
was permitted. But the results in the two countries are remarkable. In recent years, the home ownership rate in the U.S. reached a peak of 68.4 
percent of the population. In Canada, the rate has been around 68 percent! Canadian banks, now amongst the largest in the world, have suffered 
virtually no mortgage related losses in the current crisis. There is surely a lesson here!
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other markets from mid 2007 to mid 2008 – mostly through banks and other financial institutions that had 
taken on risks similar to those taken on by the large banks in the U.S. 
Fortunately, there is now significant public pressure in both the United States and Europe for a reform of the 
financial regulatory framework. Fortunately, as well, most regulatory regimes in emerging market countries 
never adopted the de-regulation fervor that affected the United States. But still there are lessons to be 
learned from the experience in the United States and Europe. There is a very large agenda to be covered in 
considering the reforms needed to better regulate and monitor financial systems. A paper prepared in the 
IMF earlier this year set out that agenda rather clearly.11 The main elements were listed as follows:
Instituting a macro-prudential approach to supervision and assigning a clear mandate to a   systemic  •	
stability regulator.
Expanding the perimeter of financial sector surveillance to ensure that the systemic risks  posed by  •	
unregulated or less regulated financial sector segments are addressed.
Ensuring  that  prudential  regimes  encourage  incentives  that  support  systemic  stability  and  •	
discourage regulatory arbitrage, and assure effective enforcement of regulation.
Addressing  the  procyclicality  of  existing  capital  requirements  and  other  prudential  norms,  •	
preferably in a manner that is rules based and counters the cycle.
Filling the information gaps, especially with regard to lightly regulated financial institutions, and  •	
ensuring that both supervisors and investors are provided more disclosure and a higher level of 
granularity in information provided.
Resolving the political and legal impediments to the effective regulation of cross-border institutions;  •	
developing  special  insolvency  regimes  to  be  used  for  large  cross-border  financial  firms;  and 
harmonizing remedial action frameworks.
Strengthening the capacity of central banks to provide liquidity and respond to systemic shocks. •	
Improving  the  capacity  of  national  authorities  to  respond  to  systemic  crises,  including  by  •	
establishing mechanisms for coordination both within and across borders.
Establishing the basis for fiscal support during the crisis containment and restructuring phase, and  •	
an exit strategy for withdrawing public support and for a transition to a new and more  
stable financial market structure.
An additional item could be added to this list that should be on the agenda of every financial sector 
regulator in the world. Should financial institutions be prevented through regulation and supervision from 
ever becoming too large to fail?
This is an ambitious agenda and will require the active engagement not only of national regulators and 
supervisors but also of the relevant regional and international bodies such as the Basel Committees, 
the international standard setting agencies, the Financial Stability Board, and others. It will also require 
a  broadened  surveillance  mandate  for  the  IMF,  especially  to  widen  the  focus  of  its  Financial  Sector 
Assessments (FSAPs) and to make them mandatory.
11  “Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation of Financial Institutions and Markets and for Liquidity Management”, International Mon-
etary Fund, February 4, 2009.
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When  considering  the  policies  of  emerging  market  countries  that  warrant  re-thinking,  the  reserve 
accumulation policies of some of those countries over the last decade must be near the top of the list. This 
is, of course, related to the undue reliance on exports as a source of growth for many emerging market 
countries and the associated trade and current account surpluses that resulted. The global imbalances of 
the past decade are an integral element of the tapestry that led to the explosion of credit that took place 
across many corners of the global economy and, ultimately, to the financial crisis in the United States. 
In turn, those imbalances were made possible by the decline in savings in the United States – both by 
consumers and by the federal government. At least for American consumers, this is changing and it will 
force a rethinking of the policies of the last decade – in both the United States and in many of the largest 
emerging market countries. At the federal government level, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, the current 
deficits resulting from the stimulus packages, the support measures for the financial sector, and other 
policies are, in general, the appropriate response to the current crisis. However, those deficits cannot be 
sustained without threatening the credit worthiness of the country or forcing tax and spending adjustments 
that will be politically unacceptable. So change will come. It will either be forced in a disorderly manner, or 
it can be managed through policy adjustment. The latter would obviously be a better process! 
But there are other reasons for change. Some emerging market countries, China in particular, have persisted 
with polices that one can argue may not have been in their own best interest. They have accumulated far larger 
reserves than can be justified by almost any logic and done so at the cost of more rapid improvement in the 
living standards of their people.12 Also, they have accumulated assets – dollar denominated, and sometimes 
yielding negative returns – that suggest that this has been a very costly trade off for these countries.13 In the 
case of China, there are different views regarding what can be done to increase spending by Chinese consumers 
– a sine qua non for an orderly correction of the imbalances. Some argue that the creation of social safety nets 
– already underway by the Chinese authorities, will decrease the felt need to save. Others argue that the high 
savings rates are, at least in part, the result of (relatively) declining rural incomes in the country and that greater 
infrastructure and other investments and an expansion of banking in those areas will help bring about the 
needed change. Whatever the remedy, most observers believe that it is possible through changed policies to 
generate much larger internal demand in China. The outcome of China’s current stimulus package may hold 
important lessons in regard to the capacity to spur domestic demand through public policy.
Such a fundamental restructuring of the Chinese economy and some other large emerging market economies 
will cause these countries to become somewhat less coupled to the industrial world, and to the U.S., in particular. 
This is probably to the good for the performance of the global economy. However, this will occur in an orderly 
manner only if this systemic issue is addressed through internationally coordinated policies. The IMF has a role 
to play here both in the conduct of its surveillance responsibilities and in its role as a forum for the engagement 
of senior policy makers on the economic and financial issues that confront individual countries and the global 
economy. However, it will have the authority and capacity to play that role only if fundamental changes are 
made to the governance structure and some of the operations of the institution.14
12  An important question regarding the IMF needs to be addressed in this connection: was one of the motivations for the large reserve accumu-
lation that took place in so many emerging market countries motivated, at least in part, by a lack of trust in the institution?  The IMF is, among 
its other functions, intended to be the global reserve-pooling organization. Why have the emerging market countries felt the need to insure 
themselves through the accumulation of their own excessively large holdings of reserves? Some of this has to do with the experiences of those 
countries that fell into crises over the past two decades in dealing with the IMF; some of it had to do with the increasing stigma that became 
attached to borrowing from the institution; some of it may have come from the perception – and reality! – that the resources available to the IMF 
were not nearly sufficient to the needs of 21st century global financial markets; and some of it may have been the result of a growing disparity 
in the IMF between the economic and financial place of these countries in the global system and their place in the governance structure of the 
IMF.  Hopefully, the reforms recently made in the IMF and those that are now under discussion will fundamentally change the institution in a way 
that will permit all countries to see it as a trusted partner in the event of a need for financial support.
13  It is also likely that the existence of these claims – in the form of obligations to foreign holders of US treasury bills and agency securities – led 
to second best policy choices by the U.S. government in deciding on actions to deal with certain aspects of the recent financial crisis.
14  See Jack Boorman, “Global Governance and Reform of the International Monetary Fund: An Update”, Emerging Markets Forum, Mumbai, India, 
June 24, 2009.
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The third question raised above can be answered only as more experience is gained with the policies that 
emerging market countries have designed and implemented to help counter the current recession. While 
the initial impressions are generally positive, it will take more time to see their results and judge their 
effectiveness. There has been debate on the potential costs and benefits of such measures since the crisis 
turned for the worse in the fall of 2008 and countries began to introduce stimulative packages. At the 
meeting of The Group of Twenty in Washington, D.C. in November, 2008 a Declaration was issued by the 
Leaders pledging to “Use fiscal measures to stimulate domestic demand to rapid effect, as appropriate, 
while maintaining a policy framework conducive to fiscal sustainability”.15 Commitments were also made, 
with fiscal implications, to “Continue our vigorous efforts and take whatever further actions are necessary 
to stabilize the financial system”.
Even as the measures were being prepared and announced, many of the familiar critiques of fiscal policy 
were voiced:
Fiscal policy – especially spending measures - inevitably acts with sometimes long and unpredictable  •	
lags. This runs the risk that the impact on the economy may well be felt only after the economy has 
already begun to recover.
The effectiveness of spending measures is likely to be adversely affected if those measures are  •	
rushed and not subjected to the scrutiny possible in calmer times.
The possibility of withdrawal of the stimulus is limited when large projects are involved and which  •	
must be brought to completion to produce intended results.
Such  spending  can  be  counterproductive  in  terms  of  its  impact  on  the  economy  if  it  is  not  •	
accompanied by a credible plan to restore fiscal rectitude so as to avoid adverse or negative effects 
in the financial markets.
These and other arguments must be taken seriously if fiscal stimulus measures are to have their intended 
effects. Needless to say, it is not possible to generalize across the many countries that have adopted such 
policies, nor has there been sufficient time to assess the impact of most of the packages that have been 
announced and are being implemented. But there are some negative signs already emerging that must be 
taken seriously and, to the extent possible, used to adapt policies already announced or even in place to 
counter the potential negative effects. Many of the stimulus packages have focused on infrastructure. There 
can be no doubt that almost all countries are in need of sometimes substantial investment in infrastructure to 
improve the growth prospects of their economies. However, those projects with long planning horizons and 
long gestation periods must be kept under review to avoid a situation in which such projects inappropriately 
crowd out private spending as a recovery begins to take hold. To the extent such projects are judged to be 
worth pursuing, consideration should be given to raising taxes to pay for them. 
Even more important, plans must be elaborated for the withdrawal of stimulus: tentative plans to cancel 
or phase out projects, plans to increase taxes to better marry the size of the stimulus to the needs of the 
economy as recovery takes hold. Credible plans to wind down and reverse the stimulus and to restore long 
term, sustainable fiscal positions should be elaborated. This last point is worth emphasizing in light of the 
enormous financing demands that are going to emerge from the measures already announced by so many 
countries. The financial tensions emerging in the debt markets cannot be permitted to intensify to the point 
where they begin to crowd out emerging private activity that will be needed to sustain any recovery. As 
noted earlier in the paper, this is already becoming an issue. In the recent downgrades and lowered outlooks 
15  Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, November 15, 2008.
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their respective economies …” has been highlighted. The impact on interest rates and on the receptivity of 
markets to debt auctions is already becoming evident.
None of this argues for premature withdrawal of the stimulus that is needed to help foster a sustainable 
recovery in many countries and in the global system. The lessons from the reversal of policies in the 
United States in 1937 and in the similar experience of other countries need to be remembered. However, 
the markets will need to be continuously reassured that these policies are temporary and that they will 
be adjusted to the needs of the economy as their impact begins to be felt. This is also an argument for 
better global coordination of these policies. The markets that fund sovereign debt are global and the 




Some of the causes of the current crisis are clear. These include the failure to correct the global imbalances 
that ballooned in the years leading up to the crisis; the absence of the needed degree of transparency in 
financial markets; the failures of national regulatory and supervisory systems and the absence of sufficient 
mechanisms for international regulatory coordination; the failures to prevent the emergence of perverse 
incentives in the financial system, especially in mortgage markets in the United States; the willingness of 
senior people in the banks and other financial institutions to accept financial innovations and instruments 
that even they now admit they did not understand. And there are many others.
In general terms, the lessons to be learned are implicit in the causes. But there is a great deal more that 
needs to be done to translate the lessons into specific measures that will have the power to correct the 
practices that got the world into this mess – and that has been so costly both to societies and to so many 
individuals. The measures needed will affect both domestic agencies and international organizations. 
Discussion in this Forum can make an important contribution to the ongoing debate about preventing 
another crisis of the nature and magnitude now confronting the entire world. In addition to the three 
questions elaborated above, other questions that would be worth discussing include the following:
Have the emerging market countries decoupled from the industrial world to any significant degree  1. 
or have the two groups, on the contrary, become even more mutually dependent on each other? Is 
“decoupling” - framed as a proposition about the linkages between the major industrial countries 
and the emerging market countries - even a useful concept any longer?  Are not the inter-linkages 
between  the  larger  emerging  market  countries  –  China,  Brazil,  India  and  others  –  becoming 
analytically and empirically just as relevant?
What are the prospects that the macroeconomic structures in key countries that led to the global  2. 
imbalances of the last decade – and helped bring about the current crisis, will change with a 
recovery in those countries, avoiding a return to another unsustainable pattern of growth?
Related to this, can the emerging market countries succeed in stimulating their domestic economies,  3. 
i.e., by structurally increasing domestic demand, if growth in the industrial countries remain as 
weak, or even weaker, than projected?
What are the prospects for access by the emerging market countries to global credit and capital  4. 
markets given the continued deleveraging that is likely to occur in major financial institutions and 
the possibility that they will be crowded out of the debt markets by sovereign borrowers facing the 
need to finance unprecedented fiscal deficits and to roll over existing debt?
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measures  are  carefully  responding  to  the  inevitable  political  demands  for  protection  in  a 
recessionary environment while not doing much that could threaten a recovery of trade?
The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Emerging Market Economies:
16The Emerging Markets Forum is a not-for-profit initiative that 
brings  together  high  level  government  and  corporate  leaders 
from  around  the  world  for  dialogue  on  the  key  economic, 
financial  and  social  issues  facing  emerging  market  countries 
- a dialogue that concludes with consensus and commitment to 
actionable outcomes.
The Forum is focused on some 50 emerging markets economies 
in Asia, Europe, Latin America, Middle East and Africa that share 
prospects  of  superior  economic  performance,  already  have 
or  seek  to  create  a  conducive  business  environment  and  are 
of near term interest to private investors, both domestic and 
international.
The dialogue at the EMF Global and Regional Meetings is based 
on  a  Series  of  papers  written  by  world-renowned  authorities 
exclusively for these meetings.
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